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Introduction
Managers in charge
nize

competitive

marketing
as well

of international

conditions

decisions.

designed

to control

economies

environment

unfair

the abuses

activities

governments

all

extraterritorially.
markets

and adherence

to statutes

This paper

will

competition.

reluctant

have

countries

to apply

of multinational

1

with market

of American multinationals

incompatib le with the EEC treaty.

policy

with

The study points

law

to compete in

depend upon their

development

practices

antitrust

firms

the historical

certain

Furthermore,

their

business

in the Common Market.

case with

regulations

practices

which regulate

competing

antitrust

government

As the

of monopoly power and proscribe

Economic Community (EEC) competition

of its

strategies

competition.

business

increasingly

discusses

and

of competitors'

major developed

The ability

international

must recog-

distribution,

has expanded,

which restrain

have become less

decisions

which affect

or restrictive

Today, nearly
prohibit

enterprise

arrangements

business

proliferated.

to make production,

They must be cognizant

as institutional

international

business

recognition

operations.
of European

regard

to U.S. firms

out the business

that

have been determined

Further,

'the Community's

IBM, and the effects

to be

settlement

of the agreement

are

analyzed.

The Extraterritorial

Application

In 1958 the Benelux countries,
the Treaty
Treaty

France,

of Rome and formed the European

states

to ensure

of EEC Competition

that

in Article
competition

3(F) that

Italy,

Rules

and Germany signed

Economic Community.

the Conununity must institute

in the Common Market

is not distorted.

2

The
a system

Articles

85 and 86 of the Treaty

with public

and private

Article
practices,
affect

provide

enterprise

85, paragraph
agreements,

one, of the EEC Treaty

and decisions

points

or distorting

out that

price

placing

dissimilar

trading

partners

Paragraph
prohibitions

three

improvement

within

any activity

and,

deemed acceptable

sharing,

85 allows

or distribution

or economic progress
per se,

the EEC.
tying

3

of preventing,

Article

85(1)

agreements

transactions

and

with oth~r

for exemptions

one if the activities

of production

such practices

the Treaty.

of Article

of paragraph

within

to equivalent

may violate

if

concerted

and have the object

market

conditions

prohibits

of enterprises,

competition

fixing,

law to deal

activity.

tr ad e between EEC member states

restricting

the competition

the EEC.

contribute

to the

of goods or promote

any restraint

if economic or technological

technical

85 does not proscribe

Tl'\us, Article

in theory,

from the

of trade

may be

improvements

are likely

to be forthcoming.
Article

86 prohibits

or more enterprises
CommonMarket. 4
acquisition
proscribed.
scale

the abuse of a dominant

if trade

is affected

The provision

The Article

points

abuses:

(1) directly

imposing

limiting

production,

markets

dissimilar

or discriminatory

monopolies

the EEC's approval

out a non-exhaustive
unfair

purchase

or technical
conditions

2

list

of the

or the
position

developments;

is

large-

multinationals.
of possible

or selling

to equivalent

by one

of building

to compete with foreign

However, the Article

part

only the abuse of a dominant

signals

firms of community size

position

in a substantial

does not disallow

of monopoly power,

market

prices:

(2)

(3) applying
transactions:

or

(4) concluding

contracts

have no connection

with

The supranational
implementation

of such contracts.

administrative

body primarily

business

Cartel

6

theory."

application
decision

granted

of approximately
for the first

of account

and simultaneous

price

Commission reasoned
economic unit

that

company, and,

applicable

to all

throughout

restrictions

fifty

officials.

three

a total

in Switzer-

of 540,000 units
involving

the Common Market.

and a subsidiary

of competition

Dyes

of the group

practice

EEC rules

The

in the Aniline

including

of a subsidiary

consequently,

Directorate-

the "unity

in a restrictive

then the action

under Article

85 occurred

Kingdom, were fined

when a parent

of Articles

time a ban on enterprise

dye manufacturers,

increases

17,

in non-member countries.

of Article

for participating

in the

under Regulation

by the Competition

which established

Eleven aniline

The Commis-

nationalities

from prohibition

land and one in the United

parent

all

to companies with headquarters

(69/243)

for the

exemptions

In 1969, the EEC extended

extraterritorial

responsible

invoke the prohibitions

(DG IV) which consists

activities

that

practices,

The Commission is advised

General

obligations

is the EEC Commission.

members which represent

and 86, and grant

85(3). 5

policy

The Commission has the power,

to investigate
85(1)

supplementary

the subject

of competition

sion has fourteen
Community.

which contain

uniform
The

form a single

can be imputed

to the

of competition

are

which affect

trade

in the

has resulted

in an

CommonMarket.
The advent
increase

of EEC extraterritorial

in the application

In 1970, Continental

jurisdiction

of EEC competition

provisions

Can Company of New York, through

3

its

to U.S. firms.
European

subsidiary

Europemballage,
7

Thomassen.

signed

Continental

an agreement

purchased

91 percent

1970.

The Commission i mmediately

sition

and in December of 1971 decided

dominant

market position

purchase

of Thomassen.

practically
EEC.

based,

competition

firms

Continental
metal

showing the

of attempting

the Continental

to regulate

have been involved
marketing

and refusal

to supply

was found guilty

customers

different

was no objective
decision
entire

lies

reason

marketing

practices
torted

competition

of Belgian
units

Art1cle

decision
was

of U.S.

United

Brands Company

for price

discrimination

European

largest

markets

that

with the goals

seller

The importance

UBC indulged

of integrated

of

and charging
although

the Commission investigated

to determine

European

the

there
of the

firm's

in business

markets

and undis-

in the CommonMarket.

86 by charging

automobile

of account

their

to the member state,

The Commission found in 1973 that
infringed

the behavior

UBC, the world's

according

that

in the

on which the decision

for such discrimination.

fact

policy

at variance

9

of fragmenting

prices

in the

of account

distributors.

products

had

8

In 1975,

units

the acquisition

concerning

practices.

one million

that

by its

a number of American multinationals

in EEC investigations

and production

(UBC) was fined

bananas,

Can case,

industry

the Commission's

facts

in the CommonMarket was established.
Since

of the acqui-

packaging

annulled

of

Can had abused its

container

in certain

the Court of Justice

the precedent

of Thomassen in April

The Commission reasoned

in 1972 for not sufficiently

the Dutch firm

opened an investigation

in the light

eliminated

Although

to purchase

inspection

was levied

a price

General
that

certificates.

against

the

4

Motors Continental
was abusive
10

A fine

firm for the

for the issue
of 100,000

infringement.

In

1972, Commercial
units

Solvents

Corporation

for abuse of a dominant

for the
fined

first

The Commission held that

thus,

by refusing
appreciably

Although
tices

Commercial

restricted

competition

rulings

agreements

U.S. enterprises

possibility
research

hastens

enterprises
Article

in research
85, paragraph

to exempt business
contribution

Henkel-Colgate
tive

(72/41).

of the balancing

acceptability
Colgate-Palmolive

efforts

12

ZOJA, and,

for prac-

and development

and enhance

The Henkel-Colgate

into

5

group.

empowers the Commission

is

likely

practices

if a

to result.

by the Commission in
decision

is highly

Henkel of Dusseldorf,

of New York entered

of

the 10-nation

in the EEC to determine

practices.

the

Consequently,

to the cooperation

throughout

the

they recognize

innovation.

was granted

utilized

between

and applied

from the ban on restrictive

process

market

U.S. multinationals

Also,

of the Rome.Treaty

exemption

of concerted

were fined

made in pure

or economic progress

13

dominant
firm,

of enterprises

and development

remarkable

11

the fine.

have been authorized.

in the economy.

activities

its

other

research

to remove obstacles

to technical

A rather

that

three,

and

from the Commission and Court of

the pace of technological

the Comrnission has tried

abused

laws,

the competitiveness

of development

in paying

firms

American

and Common·Market firms

detennine

market,

in the EEC.

for joint

The Commission maintains

200,000

case the Commission

to an Italian

on EEC competition

favorable

Several

Solvents

nitropropane

the above-mentioned

have received

research

in the nitropropane

for each day'.s delay

to sell

which infringed

Justice.

position

time in any Community competition-law

the company 1000 units

position

of New York was fined

an agreement

indicathe

and

to coordinate

their

development

of laundry

controlled

37 percent

Colgate

Commission approved

soaps and detergents.
of a highly

the agreement

because

receive

a fair

share

greater

supply

of improved products.

"technical
tition

of the benefits

progress"

between

Henkel and

oligopolistic

market,

they believed

consumers

from the cooperation

the

efforts

and its

was predictable,

two other

large

would

through

The Commission contended

from the joint

Henkel-Colgate

Although

a

that
and compe-

competitors

would

was granted

by the

be promoted.
In a similar

case,

an exemption

Commission on a specialization
national

in Trenton,
14

Amsterdam.
lands

activities

manufacture,

recovery

out in its

equipment

findings

a jointly-owned
proportion
lowering

of total

entering
Also,

maintenance

agreed
and sale

costs

plants.

the agreement

should

near capacity,

represented

by fixed

located

venture

production

The firms

to operate

Interin

in the Nether-

and marketing

to cooperate

in the

of compressors

used in

The Commission pointed
benefit
thus
costs

users

by allowing

reducing

the

and, ultimately,

prices.
implication

of the EEC Treaty

expertise

their

in large-scale

that

plant

The important
85(3)

Europe.

DeLaval Turbine

Corporation,

formed a joint

of combining

throughout

between

and Stork

DeLaval and Stork

development,
heat

agreement

New Jersey

for the purpose

from prohibition

may be able
into

joint

specialization

from the exemptions

is that

American

to efficiently

cooperation
agreements

rationalize

the production

favorably

by the Cornmission.

firms

penetrate

agreements
between

or distribution
15

6

with

granted

under

specific

technical

European markets

with Common Market

U.S. and European
process

Article

firms

by
firms.
which

have been viewed

The cases
designed

cited

suggest

that

to promote · competition

ning and operation
legislation,
the risk

governmental

have a significant

effect

of U.S. firms

and litigation
associated

competing

affect

priorities.

1984 of its

long-standing
to produce

corporate

investigation

Regulation,

multinationals

goals,

The Conunon Market's

settlement

effects

enter,

and research

and

on August 1,

of the business

the most profound

actions

on the plan-

in the EEC.

the businesses

with attaining

development

is likely

supranational

practices

of IBM

for multinationals

to

date.

Background of the IBM Case
The EEC Directorate
marketing
York,

practices

of Competition

of International

(IBM), in 1974 after

,::ompetitors
d:i.oid .E~s of

National

U.S. -based

updating

programs

accused

of delays

in updating,

of the software.

accused

IBM of generating

in industry

circles

in customers

of the interface

that

fear,

between

Commission conducted

product

were subsi-

its

feet

Specifically,

and doubt

is announced

and computer
between

between

the

IBM salesmen

operating

hardware.

cor-

- known as "fud"

and shipped,
the

and

Amdahl Corp.

Allegedly,

by not making public

Inc.

IBM was

and making engineering

market.

7

Systems,
in servicing

to such charges,

an investigation

of IBM's

and Four-Phase

uncertainty,

software

from five

Memorex Corp. , Amdahl Corp. ,

debugging,

In addition

of the

of Armonk, New

companies

IBM dragged

- in the software

time a new IBM software
"fud"

All five

run on non-IBM hardware.

rections

create

16

Manguson Corp.,

had long complained

Machines

complaints

f irrns and included

Advanced Systems,

The firms

Business

receiving

in the Common Market.

began an investigation

17

principles
Thus,

1974 and 1980 of the

the

marketing

practices

of IBM and its

practices

amounted to an abuse of a dominant

meaning of Article

against
after

was "without

Corp.,

13-year

of trial,

merit.

suits,

antitrust

saying

including

its

case

the evidence

1118 During this

time,

on in its

economic might which IBM wielded
publicly

and privately

annually

bought

European

supplies;

informed

close

European

economic power,

European

taxes

19

but the $1 billion

in 1983 was probably

William
personally
meeting

the considerable

are

they
from 50,000

buildings,

and

15 manufacturing

indicative

of IBM's

which the company paid

in

.ant in the settlement

20
taking

on behalf

announcement

and operated

more signific

on a firm of extensive

European Cornmunity, the EEC had to contend
vention

Memorex

The company

in land,

These facts

16 private

to the Common Market.

despite

$1 billion

suit

and the case

involving

of goods and services

European employees;
centers.

case,

the

of 1982

IBM won or settled

the European Community that

in 1983 invested

and 9 research

Besides

the

and civil

was "flimsy"

in the negotiations.

to $2 billion

had 87,000

. .
negot1at1ons.

within

in January

a Supreme Court decision

The Common Market pressed

plants

the

resembled

investigation

one of the U.S. companies which complained

equipment;

if

market position

in December of 1980, strongly

However, the U.S. dropped

six years

antitrust

filed

Department's

IBM.

to detennine

86 of the EEC Treaty.

The EEC's case,
U.S. J ustice

subsidiaries

chief

appealed

to officials

Department's

8

inter-

case against
antitrust

against

IBM,

division,

of the EEC Commission attending

of the OECD to curb the European case

in the

the June 8, 1982

of the U.S. antitrust

of the Justice

importance

with U.S. government

of IBM. Only a few days after

of the dismissal

Baxter,

economic

a Paris

the computer

company.

Also,

the first

time sent

trust

the U.S. invoked

hearings.

Department,

special

an official

observer

Sherman Unger,

was dispatched

diplomatic

procedures

to European

and for

Commission anti-

the genera l counsel

of the Commerce

to work with the Europeans

to head off

problems.
The U.S. contingent
ruling

against

negatively
dismissal

maintained

IBM would reduce

affect

U.S. trade,

throughout

the

firm's

who presided

questions

conflict

letter

to Mr. Baxter,

made public

that

effects.

by Edelstein,

The

in the EEC

over the U.S. case,

of interest

a

from innovation,

IBM and the intervention

led Judge David Edelstein,
a possible

profits

and have extraterritorial

of the U.S. case against

about

the proceedings

to raise

on Mr. Baxter's

part.

A

stated:

The U.S. government is now bootstrapping
your
action [dropping the IBM case] int o its attempt
to pressure
the EEC to drop its charges against
IBM ••.
I must seriously
question whether you
have kept your faith with either
the administration
or with your professional
responsibilities.
Needless
to say, I believe your dismissal
of the IBM case (in
the U.S.} did maj or damage to our judicial
process.
I also believe it was deliberately
timed so as to
ben~f~t_a s~~gle U.S. company in its international
activities.
The effect
persistence

of Baxter

and Unger 's "participation"

in the case is indeterminable

among Community officials
the belief

that

At stake
30\

"what's

that

for IBM was its

($12 bi lli on) of its

which IBM feared
interfaces
key element

, but the perception

U.S. represe ntatives

good for

European

1983 revenue

business,

defense

u.s."

9

abou~

The remedy

the company to disclose
a new product.

was the contention

by

22

which contributed

of $40. 18 billion.

a t the same time it announced

existed

were motivated

IBM is good for the

the most would force

in IBM's legal

on the EEC's

details

Consequently,
that

early

of
a

disclosure

could

eliminate

the company's

around the world and reduce
representatives
disclose

proprietary

U.S. had ruled

that

details

shipment.

before

the principles

23
its

established

exercise

interest

a statement

decision

IBM lawyers
principles

of objections

in internal

jurisdic

that
tion

In the statement

their

of IBM practices

of objectives

for Competition,

issued

infringements

of Article

Common Market.
limit

product

under Article

practices
86 because

by one or more firms

Specifically,
or technical

not have

to make a

the Commission informed

regarding

The marketing

the

December 19, 1980 by the

decision

exploitation

since

of the IBM Case

17 had been ·initiated

infringements

with a

in the EEC.

to Regulation

24

has a duty
face of

intention

pursuant

.

a state

o_f the

was that

procedure

f ort h coming.

affairs

state

IBM's contention

the

law, namely

in the

of another

indicating

Particulars

General

that

in the U.S. in 1980, the Community should

on the legality

Director

technical

of international

of enforcement

in the matter.

judge in the

maintained

maintains

LBM

not have to

IBM should

when judge after

with the law or policy

case was not settled
issued

Finally,

Further,

have to disclose

The comity principle

conflict

substantial

that

of comity or non -int erference

States.

potential

to innovate.

information

the company didn't

Commission breached

to consider

the incentive

at the Conunission argued

valuable

United

lead time on new products

of IBM were investigated
the statute

the Article

10

and that

86 of the EEC Treaty

of a dominant

developments,

IBM that

prohibits
position

proscribes
or " tying

contracts,"

a
was
for

the abusive

within

activities

a

the
which
i.e.,

when a product
certain

is sold only on the condition

additional

products

or services

The Commission did not set
establishing

its

settlement

jurisdiction

issued

manufacturing

equipment

controls

two-thirds

almost

August.

European operations

of IBM provided

In order

of an infringement

an abusive

historically,

in the EEC.

market

Also,

for "mainframe"
Clearly,

the foundation

and

the firm
computers,

the extensive

for the Common

or to make an order

under Article
in a specific

practice

86, it had to establish
geographic

had taken place.

Instead,

the main emphasis

the use of market power toward suppliers

and product

It must be pointed

the Commission has been virtually

how dominance was acquired.
supervising

of the computers

for the Commission to impose a fine

and that

out that,

in the 15 page

in the case.

IBM held a dominant position

market

it used for ·

percent

in every country.

to jurisdiction

for termination
that

ninety

of Europe's

supplier

claim

the criteria

the company sells

and is the foremost

Market's

from the seller.

However, IBM has 15 European

which produce

data processing

the buyer purchase

over IBM's activities

in early

plants,

forth

that

indifferent

to

has been on

and purchasers

once

dominance had been achieved.
The issue
concerned
that

of whether

a firm has a dominant

with structural

an enterprise

the question

in its

power analysis
percentage
automatically

holds

of abusive

established

competition.

Continental

is required

of market

share

indicating

in a specific

is considered.
Can (6/72)

to establish

that

market dominance.

a dominant position.

market before

The Court of Justice

decision

has been established

11

is

The Commission must determine

a dominant position
behavior

market position

a full
25

as a threshold

market
No exact
for

Thus, the Commission

considers

a firm's

control

over techno l ogical

over raw materials

expertise;

.

as well

The second determination
behavioral

concerned

competition
abuses

aspects

the abusive

many enterprise

in the IBM matter

may ultimately

the imposition

of unfair

terms

which. controlled

a refusal

4)

the excessive

5)

discriminatory

pricing;

6)

the imposition

of exclusive

to supply

suggests

that

that

firm occupied

computer

units
systems

.
maintenance

. the

upon members of
rights;

competition;
customer;

inspection

certificates;

purchase

privileges.

of what constitutes

been determined
from this

an

on a case-by-case
approach

them to exist,

is that

and that

basis.
abuses

the process

to firms with market power in their

is

relations

and competitors.

The Commission's

processing

reduced

the definition

where the Commission finds

with customers

EEC

and

can be reached

meant to be a deterrent

and conditions

of automobile

has primarily

Obviously,

86 were:

goods to a longstanding

pricing

This area

IBM investigation,

music performance

3)

The conclusion

86.

be found to violate

under Article

a merger which substantially

practice

under Article

use of economic power by the company.

2)

abusive

the

the Commission undertook

However, at the time of the

an association

occur

for the develop-

which had been prohibited

This list

command

as the likelihood

of competition

activities

rules.

1)

its

26

ment o f competitors.

involved

and capital;

case against

a dominant
and basic

.
o f sue h units.

market position

software

and, thus,

IBM was founded upon the premise

for the

independently
27

in the

supply

of central

IBM 360 and 370 type

controlled

The Commission estimated

12

that

the operation
that

and

IBM had 40\

of the total

computer market

the data processing
adhered

market

to the criterion

Continental

in Europe.

decision,

firm has the power to act

sions

taken

seven times
more than

shares

of firms

than

the sales

its

nearest

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
Source:
Based upon this

International
information,

market power was great

implication

dominance

in this

dominance

can be settled

touchstone

to dominance

interfere

companies

case

with effective

totaled

combined.

Europe

984
926
860

841
775

the Commission established

trade

showed that
competition

that

member states.

determination

the question

of market

is eliminated.

between member states.
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The

of

Thus,

in the IBM case was the power to prevent
competition

IBM

requir ement of

between

from the Commission's

before

percentage

Data Corporation

to affect

is it

competitors,

10,634
1,537
1,380
1,160
1,053

enough to meet the minimal

the ability

when a

in 1983 were

and actually

Revenues In Western
1983
($ millions)

in the

in many EEC deci-

revenues

IBM (U.S. )
Bull (France)
Siemens (W. Germany)
(Italy)
Olivetti
Digital
Equipment (U.S.)
ICL (U. K.)
Nixdrof (W. Germany)
Burroughs (U.S . )
NCR (U.S.)
(U. S.)
Hewlett-Packard

2.

most important

was a smaller

competitor
largest

exists

considering

conside red dominant

of the nine next

1.

i.e.,

without

86 , ·but IBM's sales

Data Processing

dominance,

dominance

IBM's market share

under Article
greater

namely that

and 38\ of

the Commission

by the Court of Justice

independently

or suppliers.

than the market

and microcomputers)
Furthermore,

established

Can (6/72)

purchasers,

(mainframes

the
or

The EEC Commission determined
had abused its

dominant position

through

its

investigation

under Article

that

IBM

86 of the EEC Treaty

in

four ways:
1)

by failing

to supply

with the technical
products
2)

manufacturers,

information

System/370

a capacity

in sufficient

needed to permit

to be used with System/370

by not offering

without

other

competitive

("interface

central

information");

processing

of main memory included

time,

units

("CPU's")

in the price

("memory

bundling");
3)

by not offering

included
4)

in the price

to supply

("Installation

.

These practices

offer

Article

systems.

IBM's marketing
with central

processing

Commission because
price.
position

manufacturers

fall

of non-IBM

laws because

into

of supplying

categories

under

production

main memory or basic
"bundling"

or

without

as protecting
elements

its

a separate
market

position

designed

software

by the

an abuse of a dominant

14

with

practices.

were supplied

processing

limited

for competitors

limiting

was considered

IBM was perceived

they

as be compatible

three

and discriminatory

was considered

which produce

services

opportunities

(bundling);

the components

The practice
because

units

IBM

28

The abuses

policy

in that

IPOs) to users

to compete with as well

developments;

software

and

installation

on EEC competition

arrangements

the basic

of IBM software,

Options"=

and restricted

designed

86: tying

technological

software

.

infringed

products

IBM computer

certain

units.

among purchasers

bundling");

between users

Productivity

centra 1 processing

CPU's without

("software

by discriminating

refused

choice

System/370

against

to be plug-

who

compatible

with IBM's System/370

"bundling"

precluded

their

computers.

European plug-compatible

own memory devices , interfered

had the potential
computer

In the Commission's

of reducing

industry.

manufacturers

with techn ical

out,

IBM engaged

from selling

developments,

the number of European

As pointed

view,

firms

and

in the

in both "software

bundling " and "memory bundling."
An

abusive

practice

which aided

the Corranission in its

of IBM's market dominance was the recognition
to "freeze"

most of the European computer

when IBM announces

a new product

details,

known as interface

physical

interconnection

components
competitors'
and formats

p ro ducts

to communicate

dominance

information

shipped

ceased,

a product

the System/370
actual

interaction

System/360
well

describes

the

between various
In order

for

a set of rules

to as Systems Network

computer

in advance

in the market

in 1964, the principles

of product

the practice

29

Beginning

shipment.

However,

of releasing

and IBM began releasing

to a customer.

details
with

inter-

only when it

the int roduction

of a new product

has preceded

of
the

by as much as 18 months.

IBM's r efusal

buyers

the technical

with IBM machines,

in 1971, announcement

shipment

uncertainty,

its

were released

as IBM gained
face

occurs

(SNA), must be known.

When IBM introduced
of operation

disclose

referred

ability

The situation

system which plug together.

used by IBM computers,

Architecture

market.

The information

and electronic

of a computer

of the company's

but doesn't

information.

determination

to provide

and doubt

are reluctant

with a new IBM product

technical

("fud")

to pu~chase
coming,

information

among European

customers.

IBM plug-compatible
they aren't

15

creates

sure

that

fear,
Potential

equipment
other

because,

equipment

will

stay

compatible.

Thus, the Conunission decided

to release

interface

information

was an abusive

detrimental

effect

on the incentive

that

IBM's failure

practice

due to the

for IBM competitors

to undertake

innovation.
The Commission also
against

EEC computer purchasers

with non-IBM computer
Commission by users
five

that

that

systems.

The complaints

of IBM products

equipment

IBM delayed

service

that

IBM refused

Productivity

produced

Option

(IPO) to users

by manufacturers

IBM's dilatoriness
non-IBM mainframes
purchasers

other

assurance

of IBM's full

market

power,

manufacturers

as it

of central

to penetrate

processing

its

units

software

in the EEC because

and prompt support

likely

and service

the practice

used on

computer
without

for its

an abusive

impeded the ability

the

software.

use of IBM's

of non-IBM computer

and compete effective

l y in the Conunon

Market. 30
The August 1984 settlement
protracted
hearing
remedies
disclosure.

Commission hearings
in February
dealing

of the EEC-IBM case was reached
and negotiations

1982, the ColMllission sent

with the issues

IBM suggested

such

Specifically,

about buying non-IBM products

Thus, the Commission considered

unless

known as an Installa-

and servicing

competition

were apprehensive

software

unit.

a service

customers

than IBM.

in providing

impaired

to supply

to the

not by .the

IBM software

processing

to supply

to use IBM software

products,

objections.
or refused

discriminated

were submitted

or competing

was used with an IBM central

they alleged

IBM had unfairly

who used or desired

firms which made the original

claimed

tion

contended

with

discussions

16

IBM. After

IBM a statement

of memory bundling
take place

after
a

of the

and interface
with Commission

officials

to resolve

discussions
ings.

the remaining

started

June hearing
submitted
final

produced

a preliminary

draft

Informal

the formal

proceed-

from t~e proceedings.

decision

Committee of national

acceptable

case.

with

in June 1983 resulted

to the Advisory

solution

in the

1983 in parallel

in April

A second hearing

concerns

The

which was then

experts

in June 1984.

to the Commission was announced

A

on August 2,

1984.

The Settlement
The agreement
points

between

and Effects

the Common Market and IBM outlines

to which IBM must adhere.

least

until

January

to enable

announcing

competing

software

products

the agreement
details

The agreement

point

requires

a new computer,

companies
of their

mandates

that

Further,

design

either

without

testing.

adequate

companies,

to offer

its

and timely

its

called

Open Systems

improving

that

will

efforts

17

and

point

better
with

in

technical
A

enable
IBM machines.

CPUs in the EEC,
necessary

to match its

standard

for
Systems

used by other

Interconnection .

the agreement

the position

four

for the System/370.

System/370

to the communications

The EEC is of the opinion
of substantially

at

information

Another

to communicate

IBM is to continue

Network Architecture
European

products

within

both hardware

main memory or with only the capacity

Finally,

to last

interface

to the System/370.

of such information

to hook up their
IBM must undertake

IBM provide,

in the EEC to attach

IBM to disclose

in the publication

competitors

is scheduled

sufficient

of the Systems Network Architecture

speed-up

four

of 1990.

The most important
months after

of the Undertaking

will

of both users

(OSI ) • 31
have the effect
and competitors

in

the markets

for System/370

ability

of interface

putting

their

duction.

products

information

products

in the EEC.

allows

on the market

Consequently,

The earlier

competitors

in the Common Market to be strengthened

effective.

The clear

an element
buyers

of certainty

will

will

will

possibility

of a choice

at an earlier
Finally,

also

purchased

with IBM products.

introduces
Potential

from othe~

Thus, much of the

by IBM's announcement

Additionally,

between different

users

will

hardware

of new

now be given

and software

the

suppliers

time.
as a result

chance to buy mainframe
memory, customers

of IBM's agreement
computers

without

from an IBM rival.

substantial

capacities

customers

main memory at a

the practice

will

enjoy

which have not existed

the

data-storage

to purchase

As IBM abandons

of main memory, users

opportunities

to offer

purchasing

have the opportunity

will

lower price

competitors'

of

and made more

IBM's conduct

equipment

and doubt generated

be eliminated.

structure

which had been missing.

that

be compatible

uncertainty,

products

to customers

have more assurance

manufacturers
fear,

regarding

of

with an IBM intro-

the

competition

statement

the opportunity

simultaneously

the Commission expects

avail-

of bundling

choices

and

previously.

Conclusion
The European Economic Community's
competition
largest

case

computer

against

manufacturer,

complex competition
government
technical

entity

International

action

after

Business

brought

Machines,

to an end the

in EEC history.

has persuaded

disclosures

August 1984 settlement

18

the world's

longest

and most

It marks the first

IBM to meet a specific

a product

of its

announcement.

schedule
Also,

it

time any
for
appears

to

be the

first

business

agreement

practices

The agreement
cations

for

in other

guidelines
enterprises

between

the computer

Although

competing

by a government

body.

in Europe as well

European marketing

to affect

the conduct

in the CommonMarket.

complex competition

by which IBM's

in its
issues

ability
involving

economic power.
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companies

only indicates

practices,

the

of multinational

Further,

it

to proficiently
firms

ramifi-

as dominant

the compromise settlement

IBM must make in its
can be expected

procedures

IBM and the EEC may have widespread

industry

the Commission is confident
decide

formal

can be reviewed

industries.

what changes

to establish

is clear
analyze

with worldwide

that
and
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